The recent history of the Canadian VC industry has been marked by unprecedented transition, growth and optimism, despite the downturn since 2001. However, the shortcomings in long-term research on the Canadian VC market, as well as the lack of strategic dissemination of economic and policy information, have meant that this success story has remained largely untold. The following section sheds light on the evolution of the Canadian VC market since 1996, on its key overall growth trends, and on the recent market context of VC in Canada. To flesh out the contextual backdrop, this section includes absolute and relative comparisons with the U.S. VC market.
The Canadian VC market has shown solid growth since 1996. However, it is still a relatively young industry compared to the U.S., and data on the Canadian VC industry before 1995 are less detailed than those in the U.S. Highlights of the Canadian VC industry's creation and evolution are presented here to provide context and to improve the understanding of recent market trends.Footnote 34, Footnote 35 Some of these elements will be discussed throughout the report, particularly in the review and analysis of current government programs and policies related to VC, which is presented in Part III.
Historical Highlights in the Canadian Venture Capital Industry
Early 1800s — The relatively modest financing requirements of businesses were met by the savings of individual entrepreneurs or partnerships, augmented by short-term commercial loans and reinvestment of earnings. These sources could not cover the heavy initial costs of large-scale manufacturing and distribution.
Late 1800s — The Bank Act (1871) inaugurated a system of chartered commercial banks, which principally offered short-term credit to merchants, farmers and other small businesses.
Early 1900s – Mortgage loan and life insurance companies emerged as sources of longer-term financing for business enterprises. Communities of finance capitalism developed in Montréal and Toronto. Regionally oriented groups of financiers organized in Halifax, in Quebec and in the West. In the absence of institutions such as investment banks, financiers began to form private syndicates to underwrite large capital outlays. In exchange, these syndicates took large quantities of corporate stock and common stock, to be sold later if the undertaking became profitable.
1920s — The prewar merger movement, the dramatic expansion of government securities (to finance participation in WWI) and optimism about Canada's growth prospects contributed to the development of more specialized and diversified techniques of financial underwriting. Investment banks, such as Wood Gundy and Nesbitt Thomson, began to finance business enterprises. These firms also provided professional experience and encouraged companies such as Massey-Harris to go public. The investment banks spawned specialized investment companies that held large quantities of common stocks and bonds in a variety of industries.
1930s — Mutual funds began to offer a less risky investment option for small investors and trusts.
1945 — E.P. Taylor, through contact with U.S. financier Floyd Odlum, derived the idea of forming a closed investment trust, essentially a venture capital enterprise, to acquire sufficient shares in, and to influence the decisions of, high-growth-potential companies. These firms (typified by Atlas Corporation in the U.S.) invested in companies that had undergone industrial and financial rehabilitation and showed potential for long-term development and growth.
1970s and 1980s — There was an early, core VC industry during the 1970s and 1980s consisting of a few banks and corporate, institutional and private groups. As well, many important steps were taken to build a national VC infrastructure with the creation in 1983 of the Fond de solidarité des travailleurs du Québec (FTQ), the first labour-sponsored venture capital corporations (LSVCCs).Footnote 36 However, this period also saw extreme volatility in supply.
Late 1980s — The nascent Canadian VC industry practically disappeared after the 1987 stock market crash. Banks, corporate and institutional investors either left the VC market or greatly reduced their participation for the next several years. Key private groups, such as VenGrowth, then moved to the LSVCC model for fundraising, while others, such as Ventures West, weathered the period.Footnote 37
Early 1990s — New LSVCCs led to the re-emergence of VC, as did parallel growth trends in the U.S. and Europe. These trends, along with the rekindling of private-sector interest, led to steady growth in available funds. Capital under management doubled every five years, reaching $7 billion in 1996.
Mid-1990s — The sources of venture funds diversified through the modification of LSVCC tax benefits, the liberalization of rules for institutional and foreign investors, and the introduction of government equity funds through the Business Development Bank of Canada (BDC).
Late 1990s and Early 2000s — Driven by the growth of high technology and information technology firms, many of them located in Ottawa, the Canadian VC industry experienced remarkable growth. The number of funds grew by 117 percent, and VC investments increased by 460 percent between 1996 and 2000. Venture investment became more innovation-oriented, reflected greater diversity and addressed previously neglected market segments, such as small deals and seed financing. These trends helped establish a critical mass of sophisticated entrepreneurs working closely with venture professionals to build a new generation of world-class technology companies. The fruits of these creative partnerships were borne in 1999. That year, a total of 824 companies obtained 989 rounds of financing, backed by $2.7 billion (a 63-percent increase of amount invested from the previous year's $1.7 billion).
2001–2003 — The technology bubble burst and difficult market conditions produced a global downturn of VC activity.
As explained in Part I, the Canadian VC industry is composed of professional investors who organize VC firms that establish VC funds. These VC funds first raise capital from individual and institutional investors and then invest it in portfolio companies, primarily young, high-growth-potential SMEs. These investments are usually based on individual funds' pre-established investment criteria, which are based on the investors' investment strategies and risk appetites.Footnote 38
The development of the Canadian VC industry has been shaped by a number of interrelated factors:Footnote 39
The current structure and operation of the VC industry must be understood within the context of the Canadian VC industry's development and the interplay among the key factors that shaped that development. The following section reviews the key trends behind the proliferation of VC firms and funds, their investment preferences, locations, and profiles, from 1996 to 2002. The syndication of VC deals is also discussed as a key development in the investment practices of U.S. and Canadian venture capitalists.
Solid growth in the number of venture capital firms and funds since 1996
As shown in Figure 5, the number of VC funds and firms in Canada has risen significantly since 1996. The number of VC firms increased by 92 percent from 1996 to 2002 (from 95 to 182 firms), and the number of VC funds increased by 117 percent (from 130 in 1996 to 282 in 2002).Footnote 40 The overall growth in the number of VC firms and funds, which suggests growing interest from professional investors in creating VC investment vehicles, has been a determining factor in the growth of the VC industry in Canada. The most significant impact of this proliferation of firms and funds has been a drastic increase in fundraising activities and capital available for investment.
Indeed, between 1996 and 2001, capital raised by Canadian VC funds increased from $1.7 billion to $4.6 billion. Although the burst of the technology bubble brought this figure down to $3.2 billion in 2002, this still represented an increase of 88 percent from 1996 to 2002. As explained in Part I, strong fundraising is the first step in the VC investment process because it signals that investors are generally confident in the VC investment climate and in the prospects for future returns. Canadian fundraising activities have been relatively strong (despite the difficult market conditions since 2001), showing the sustained confidence of Canadian investors in domestic firms and potential returns. Section 7 provides a more detailed review of capital under management and new capital raised and invested by investor types between 1996 and 2002.
Figure 5: Growth in the Number of Venture Capital Firms and Funds, 1996–2002
Profile of Canadian venture capital firms and funds
As explained in Part I, the composition of the Canadian VC market (see the following box) is unique because the main players are predominantly government-influenced LSVCCs, rather than private independent funds, as is the case in the U.S. The important position of this investor type changes the basis of comparison, since LSVCCs have significantly different mandates than the other investor types, such as foreign and private independent funds. Furthermore, the relatively lower participation of institutional investors continues to affect the overall growth of the Canadian VC market. The evolution and investment trends of each type of investor are presented in detail in Section 7.
Type of venture capital funds in Canada (ordered by average share of total venture capital activity in 2002)
LSVCCs are VC funds sponsored by labour unions. They are capitalized by many individual shareholders, who receive federal and/or provincial tax incentives in exchange for committing their capital for, usually, at least eight years.
Foreign investors are non-resident private VC funds or corporations active in Canada.
Private independent funds are private funds structured as limited partnerships, as well as related vehicles.
Government funds are funds created by government.
Corporations can also be subsidiaries of industrial or financial corporations.
Institutional funds are VC funds managed inside certain large institutions, such as insurance companies or pension funds.
Other investors include mutual funds and other institutional investors with interests in specific private equity deals, but without a permanent market presence.
Furthermore, according to several sources (such as Goodman and Carr LLP, Macdonald & Associates Limited, and a survey conducted by E. Wayne Clendenning for Industry Canada in 2002), the Canadian VC industry is also composed of relatively young and small VC funds compared to those in the U.S. VC market.Footnote 42 Indeed, the data and key findings revealed that Canadian VC firms tend to have the following characteristics:
This general profile of Canadian VC funds confirms that the Canadian VC industry is younger and smaller than its U.S. counterpart, as measured by size of funds and total capital under management, size of management team, and size of deals. These issues are described in more detail further in this section and in Section 9.
Top 10 venture capital investors in 2002
The following table shows the top 10 VC investors in Canada in 2002 (ranked based on the number of companies financed in 2002). Interestingly, this information suggests that the most important investors were either LSVCCs (such as the FTQ, GrowthWorks and VenGrowth Capital Partners Inc.) or government-owned funds, such as the BDC and Quebec government-owned funds such as the Innovatechs. The importance of LSVCCs and other investors is reviewed in more depth in Section 7.
Distribution of venture capital funds by sector and region
The following two tables show an increasing trend toward specialization, and a relatively constant distribution of VC funds across Canada through the 1996–2002 period.
Trends toward syndication of deals
As mentioned in Part I, Canadian and U.S. venture capitalists tend to form syndicates in which one VC firm initiates a transaction and then establishes partnerships to share the burdens of risk and capital contribution.
In Canada, syndication has become increasingly common since 1996, and especially since 1999. Syndication represented only 1.4 investors per financing in 1996, but represented 1.9 in 1999 and 2.2 in 2002.Footnote 44 This practice is even more common in the U.S., where the syndication rate was 2.8 investors per financing in 2001 and 2.9 in 2002.
The syndication of deals may raise some management challenges, particularly for investee firms. These firms may have to find a lead VC investor (the initial investor generally provides the largest amount of capital and sometimes recruits other investors), and then negotiate (directly or through the lead investor) with several venture capitalists who may have different requirements or expectations. In general, however, the trend toward syndicating VC deals is a positive development for the VC industry and for prospective portfolio companies. As indicated in Part I, syndication allows other venture capitalists into the due diligence process, which provides both a second evaluation and another option on the investment opportunities. As a result, the syndication of investments reduces risk and encourages diversification into more and different types of investments.
This practice likely confers significant advantages to Canadian VC funds, given their smaller size, their limited ability to raise sufficient capital to finance large projects, and their need to build networks and partnerships with other Canadian and foreign actors to ensure the continued growth of the VC industry. As well, syndication may be the only means to ensure that high-growth-potential companies with large capital needs, such as biotechnology firms, get access to the VC financing required to bring innovative products to market.
Performance of Canadian venture capital funds
VC is one asset class among several others, including stock options on such public markets as S&P/TSX, S&P 500 and NASDAQ. Therefore, the performance of VC as an asset class is critical to its ability to attract new capital. According to Gompers, there has been a pronounced relationship between VC fundraising activity (and VC investments) and investment performance.Footnote 45 Periods of strong performance returns have led to increased fundraising activity and, consequently, periods of accelerated fundraising activity have preceded alarming downturns in returns. While performance data have been available in the U.S. since the early 1990s, in Canada, until March 2003, there were no such performance data available to draw historical links between the growth of performance returns and VC activity in Canada.
However, given the importance of performance data in investment decisions, it is likely that the shortage of performance data in Canada has somewhat limited the growth of the Canadian VC industry, as investors have had no solid information on which to base their investment decisions. The reticence of Canadian institutional investors may also be traced to other impediments to market participation, such as tax barriers that have inhibited institutional and other investors from backing VC funds, which, in turn, has impaired market growth.Footnote 46
To address this discrepancy, the Canada's Venture Capital and Private Equity Association (CVCA), in collaboration with Macdonald & Associates Limited and Venture Economics in the U.S., has recently published a second set of performance data on Canadian VC and private equity funds for the period ending December 2002. While the data published (see Table 6) present negative returns for one-, three- and five-year periods, there are some important considerations that must be noted before any interpretations or conclusions can be drawn:
The CVCA recognized that the comprehensiveness of sector performance data can still be extended and can address such issues as including management fees to provide net return data (as in the U.S.) and developing global standards for the valuation of unrealized investments. To do this, the CVCA works closely with several interested parties (including Macdonald & Associates Limited, Réseau Capital, Venture Economics, Industry Canada, leading institutional investors, the Association for Investment Management and Research, the Institutional Limited Partners Association, and national and regional VC associations in Europe, Britain, and the U.S.) to improve the consistency and comprehensiveness of sector performance data. Particularly, the CVCA has recently recommended valuation guidelines, which have been circulated to CVCA members and others for comment.Footnote 47
The Canadian venture capital industry has been dynamic and has experienced solid growth
Whether the Canadian VC industry is in a boom or bust is a matter of perspective. While a short-term review — since 2001 — of Canadian VC activity suggests a bust, the following long-term statistics — 1996–2002 — present a picture of robust growth (see Figure 6) and increasing maturity, diversification and sophistication.
Fundraising activity and capital under management
Venture capital investment activity
Figure 6: Canadian Venture Capital Activity Trends, 1996–2002
Comparison with growth of initial public offerings and stock exchange markets
The data confirm that, compared to the Canadian initial public offering (IPO) market, the Canadian VC industry has performed relatively well over the past few years.Footnote 48
Figure 7: Number and Value of Canadian Initial Public Offerings, 1991–2000
Figure 8: Number and Value of American Initial Public Offerings, 1991–2000
Furthermore, when compared to the stock markets, the data between 1996 and 2002 suggest better performance and more stability for the stock exchange markets in Canada than in the U.S. (e.g. S&P/TSX and S&P 500) (see Figure 9). Between 1996 and 2002, the S&P/TSX grew by 47 percent and the S&P 500 grew by 34 percent, compared to a 139-percent increase in VC investments. The performance of the Canadian VC industry was particularly strong between 1996 and 2000, when the S&P/TSX and S&P 500 indexes grew by 109 percent and 83 percent, respectively, compared to 460 percent for VC investments. However, since 2000, the Canadian VC market has experienced a steeper decline than have the stock markets, falling 57 percent compared to drops of 30 percent and 27 percent for the S&P/TSX and the S&P 500, respectively.
Figure 9: Stock Market Indices, 1996–2002
As discussed in Part I, VCis only one link in the risk capital financing chain. Factors that affect other risk capital markets (such as poor performance of the stock exchanges) can have significant impacts on other sources of risk capital. To illustrate the interdependence of the public markets and the VC market, the following observations show that the poor performance of both the IPO and stock exchange markets in recent years has had significant negative impacts on the behaviour of Canadian venture capitalists and has circumscribed the growth of the VC industry.
Very slow beginning in the first half of 2003, but rebounding in the third quarter of 2003
Despite the steep decline of investment levels during the first half of 2003, the Canadian VC industry showed signs of vigour and enjoyed a stronger-than-expected third quarter in 2003, disbursing investments worth $361 million in 191 companies. This was an increase of 52 percent from the $238 million disbursed in the previous quarter. This positive third quarter was a very encouraging sign for the rest of the year, but the $920 million invested in 609 companies was still well below the $1.7 billion disbursed in 649 companies during the same period in 2002.
According to Macdonald & Associates Limited, the low level of activity in the first half of 2003 reflected the market contraction of the past two years, which has been compounded by recent world events, including the war in Iraq, and by an economic climate that remains highly uncertain. The slower economic activity level in the U.S. and the increasing strength of the Canadian dollar may also have affected Canadian VC activity in 2003, particularly as it relates to foreign investment in Canada. Interestingly, in the third quarter of 2003, VC activity levels recovered, including investments made by foreign investors.
Multinational comparisons can provide important context to any review and analysis of national VC activity. Indeed, international comparisons of VC activity, particularly with the U.S., are important benchmarks that help drive VC-related research and policy making in Canada. In that context, the following section discusses the existing definitional and statistical challenges related to international comparison. It then compares the performance, in both relative and absolute terms, of the VC markets in Canada, the U.S. and other OECD countries since 1996.
Caution with International Comparisons
There is no internationally accepted, commonly used definition of VC. In North America, the reporting of VC data uses common definitions and methodology. However, most European statistics include activities that North American analyses exclude from VC reporting. In particular, European "VC" statistics usually include some elements of private equity, such as buyouts and mezzanine financing, which North Americans consider distinct from VC. In the case of buy-ins and buyouts, the primary activity is a transfer of assets, often between generations. Conceptually, and from a policy perspective, this type of transaction is difficult to group with the equity financing of growth in early-stage companies. Mezzanine financing is closer in concept to VC, but differs in that it usually does not involve equity participation. Comparisons are difficult because in all markets, buy-ins, buyouts and mezzanine financing are major activities and may dwarf the dollar value of VC deals. The North American approach is most useful for this paper, although it would help to have a better understanding of the other markets covered in the European definitions.
In Canada, little information had been collected and published about buy-in, buyout and mezzanine financing until 2001, which saw the first report from Goodman and Carr LLP, and Macdonald & Associates Limited on the Canadian private equity market.Footnote 50 A second report, in 2002, from Goodman and Carr LLP, and McKinsey & CompanyFootnote 51 (with the assistance of Macdonald & Associates Limited) on private equity in Canada estimated that the Canadian private equity market, including VC and the buyout and mezzanine market, was worth more than $49 billion (compared to close to US$700 billion, or C$1085 billion, for the U.S. private equity market in 2002).
According to Macdonald & Associates Limited, the Canadian methodology is close to that used by firms that track the market in the U.S., including Venture Economics and Venture One.
Overall, the data suggest that, since 1996, contrary to general perceptions, the Canadian VC market has performed relatively well on a number of relative measures. In absolute terms, however, the data confirm that significant differences exist between the Canadian and U.S. VC industries, particularly when it comes to the number of companies financed, the size of VC funds and the average deal size. While other countries may not have the desire or ability to emulate the U.S. structure, lessons can still be drawn from U.S. experiences and initiatives.
Canada and the U.S. use similar definitions and methodologies to report on VC activity. However, caution must be applied when comparing the Canadian and U.S. experiences, and when trying to duplicate the U.S. model. While these comparisons can illuminate interesting linkages, they can also obscure important realities.
Keeping these considerations in mind, the following text reviews the historical highlights of the U.S. VC industry, and makes relative and absolute comparisons of the evolution and growth of the Canadian and U.S. VC industries over the past 13 years.
Historical Highlights of the American Venture Capital IndustryFootnote 52
Late 19th and early 20th centuries — Wealthy families (such as the Vanderbilts, Whitneys, Morgans and Rockefellers) began to look for ways to invest in potentially high-return, high technology companies, such as railroads, steel and oil companies, and banks.
1946 — The first modern VC firm — U.S. Research and Development (ARD) — was created by Karl Compton (Massachusetts Institute of Technology president), Merrill Griswold (Massachusetts Investors Trust chairman), Ralph Flanders (Federal Reserve Bank of Boston president) and Georges F. Doriot (Harvard Business School professor). Considered the "father of venture capital," Doriot had a vision that was not predicated on "making money," but, rather, on financing "noble" ideas.
1958 — The federal government decided to play an active role in promoting small firms' development by becoming a participant in and regulator of small-firm financing. The Small Business Administration was given the authority to charter new small business investment companies (SBICs).
Mid-1960s — Seven hundred SBICs controlled the majority of risk capital invested in the U.S.
1960s — The IPO market was extremely active. Many SBICs were able to bring companies public, creating an incentive for SBICs to invest more in risky projects.
1970s — The dramatic success of ARD — particularly with its investments in High Voltage Engineering (which produced returns on investments of $354 million) and Digital Equipment Company (which produced returns of $1.6 million) — induced individuals to create private VC firms dedicated to hands-on management. Unlike SBICs, the new VC firms provided many services to entrepreneurs, including access to investment bankers, corporate lawyers, accountants and industry experts.
1973–1974 — Recession hit young firms, IPO activity dropped and SBIC-backed firms lost money. By 1978 only 250 SBICs remained active.
1978 — Changes to the Revenue Act decreased the capital gains tax from 49.5 percent to 28 percent.
1979 — Changes to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act's "prudent man" rule explicitly allowed pension funds to invest in VC.
1980s — This rule change opened the door to tremendous capital resources. By the end of the 1980s, pension funds controlled more than $3 trillion and accounted for 47 percent (or $17 billion) of new fund commitments (compared to 15 percent, or $218 million, in 1978).
1990s and 2000s — The rapid growth in VC fundraising, the explosion of activity in the IPO market, and the exit of many inexperienced venture capitalists led to increasing VC returns. Between 1992 and 2000, new capital commitments increased 20 fold, mostly fuelled by public pension funds.
2001–2002 — This period saw the most significant downturn in VC activity and the stock exchange markets.
On a relative basis, Canada's venture capital activity has shown comparable performance since 1990
One of the most accurate measures of the relative performance of North American VC industries is the number of VC investments and the amount of VC under management as percentages of GDP. Contrary to the general perception that Canada's VC sector is tiny and stagnant compared to the U.S., the data (see figures 10 and 11) reveal that, throughout the 1990s, the relative size of the Canadian VC market was similar to that of the U.S. The U.S. VC market exploded in 1999, but the collapse in 2001 narrowed the gap between the two markets. In fact, most of the negative perception about the Canadian VC market was formed during the 1999–2000 bubble, which was an aberration in the market.
However, Figure 10 shows an increasing divergence in terms of capital under management as a percentage of GDP between the two markets since 1999. This may have significant impacts on the future growth of the Canadian VC industry compared to that of the U.S.
Figure 10: Venture Capital Under Management as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Canada and in the United States, 1990–2002
Figure 11: Venture Capital Investments as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product in Canada and in the United States, 1991–2002
The steeper decline of VC investment in the U.S. and the steadier growth of the Canadian VC industry since 2000 (see Figure 11) has increased the value of Canadian VC investments as a percentage of U.S. investments. In 2002, the value of Canadian VC investments was 8 percent of the value of U.S. VC investments (adjusted to take exchange rates into account). This proportion was much higher than the 3 percent, 4 percent and 6 percent observed in 1999, 2000, and 2001, respectively. This ratio in 2002 was roughly consistent with the relative sizes of the two economies (the Canadian GDP stood at 7 percent of the U.S. GDP in 2002) and represented Canada's approximate share of the North American market.
Links with Canada's innovation target related to venture capital
In 2002, the federal government's Innovation Strategy, Achieving Excellence, pledged to raise VC investment per capita in Canada to U.S. levels by 2010. Recent trends have significantly narrowed the gap between VC investments per capita in Canada and in the U.S. (as illustrated in Figure 12). The volatile and cyclical nature of VC activity makes it very difficult to predict whether this target will be achieved by 2010.
Figure 12: Venture Capital Investments per Capita in Canada and in the United States, 1996–2002
In 2000, for example, U.S. VC investment per capita stood at roughly 2.5 times the value of Canadian investments per capita. At that time, it seemed reasonable to establish a target to raise Canadian VC investment per capita to U.S. levels over 10 years. However, throughout 2001 and 2002, the situation changed radically, mostly due to the drastic decline of U.S. VC investments after 2001. In 2002, the Canadian VC investment per capita totalled C$81, or 69 percent of the corresponding U.S. figure of C$119 per person.
While it is useful to measure relative VC investment, this measure fails to indicate whether the capital needs of Canadian and U.S. SMEs are being met; it may be more practical and effective to define Canada's VC policy objectives in terms of outcomes, such as the amount of money invested or the number of successful companies launched, rather than simply to consider comparative data. However, this type of analysis will require more information on the demand for VC. Section 9 provides a detailed review of key policy issues and questions related to the demand-side data deficit.
On an absolute basis, the United States venture capital industry is more mature and provides larger financings
The U.S. VC market is the largest, most sophisticated and most developed VC industry in the world. The absolute numbers for 1996 to 2002 (see tables 5 and 6) show that the U.S. VC market is relatively more mature than the Canadian VC industry, both in terms of its structure (e.g. number, size, and experience of VC funds) and its fundraising and investment activities (e.g. amounts of funds raised, average deal size, and capital under management). This is to be expected from an industry that was established after 1945 and vigorously supported by private industry and government cooperation in an era of unprecedented economic growth.
Indeed, according to the Goodman and Carr LLP, and McKinsey & Company report on private equity in Canada, the average age of a Canadian VC fund is 5 years, compared to 11 years for the average U.S. fund. As well, in terms of size of funds, Canadian VC funds have an average of C$69 million of capital under management, compared to C$210 million in the U.S. This type of analysis and comparison will provide a great deal of practical experience, which can help accelerate the growth and maturation of the Canadian VC market.
While seating the analysis within the context of the past seven years does dilute the impact of the technology bubble, it still confirms that, overall, the Canadian VC industry has been active and has been maturing, with more and larger VC firms and funds, solid fundraising activities, and growing amounts of capital under management. In fact, before the 1999 burst, both Canada and the U.S. enjoyed outstanding growth. Although the pace of VC investment has slowed dramatically in both countries, the decline in the U.S. was proportionately larger than it was in Canada.Footnote 54
The steeper drop in the U.S. since 2000 resulted largely from the restriction of corporate technology spending, the continued volatility of public markets, and declining investment returns. The higher concentration in information technology (and, within this sector, the higher concentration on Internet-related sectors and communications and networking) and the absence of other modulating factors left U.S. markets more vulnerable to the technology bust.
Despite its inherent vulnerability to market fluctuations, the VC industry in the U.S. has been an important player in domestic and international investment markets. The recent history of the Canadian VC industry reflects the fact that VC was virtually absent from the Canadian financial scene as late as the early 1990s. As domestic and foreign investors began pouring VC into Canadian SMEs, the VC industry went through a catch-up phase of accelerated growth.
However, the U.S. VC industry's dramatic climb during the technology bubble, and the steep drop when the bubble burst, were less drastic in Canada. Several factors accounted for this tendency: Canadian investments had been diversified across a wide range of information technology and life sciences sectors, while U.S. venture capitalists had concentrated their investments on the Internet and other computer-related sectors. Also, the relative strength of the Canadian VC industry had been supported by unprecedented cross-border capital flows, which suggests the Canadian VC industry's maturation.
This tendency has helped to shelter the Canadian VC industry from the vagaries of the marketplace. When the investment climate cooled in the U.S., U.S. venture capitalists sought promising investment opportunities north of the border. In 2001 and 2002, some of this capital found its way into a number of large U.S. information technology and telecommunications investments in Ottawa's burgeoning high technology sectors. Ultimately, this confluence of factors diluted the effects of the technology bust in Canada. However, Canada also experienced its own bust in the middle of 2002, when activity in the communication and networking sector (particularly in Ottawa) declined precipitously, influenced in part by a perceived sector glut, public market resistance to technology stocks, and the financial and corporate government problems of telecommunications giants such as WorldCom.
Figure 13: Summary of Venture Capital Activity Trends in Canada and in the United States, 1996–2002
Comparison of return performance data in Canada and the United States
As explained in the previous section, the CVCA published the first performance data on Canadian VC funds in 2002 and 2003. While this is a major positive development for the Canadian VC market, some methodological differences exist between Canadian and U.S. returns data, which complicates comparisons of Canadian and U.S. returns.Footnote 55 However, keeping in mind these differences, some key observations can be taken from tables 7 and 8, which present the performance of VC and private equity funds in Canada and the U.S. (as of December 31, 2002).
As explained by Gompers (see Part I), periods of incredible performance returns increase the interest of investors, attract more venture capitalists to the VC industry, and thereby increase fundraising and investment. These tendencies increase the number of venture capitalists, many of whom are relatively new to the industry and, thus, tend to lack the expertise and skills required to adequately assess business opportunities and risks. As the market becomes saturated, a wider range of firms, many of which would not represent viable investment opportunities under normal market conditions, are able to attract VC. In North America, particularly in the U.S., this stimulation of VC activity was followed by a decline in performance returns and a concomitant drop in investor confidence and interest.
The Canadian venture capital industry has been more stable than the United States' industry since 2001, except for the first half of 2003
U.S. VC investments declined significantly in 2001 and 2002, the first decline since 1993. VC investment fell from $105.9 billion (C$159 billion) in 2000 to $40.6 billion (C$61 billion) in 2001 and $21.2 billion (C$32 billion) in 2002. The capital invested in 2002 represented nearly a 50-percent decrease from 2001 (compared to a 35-percent decline in Canada over the same period). As a result, investment levels in the U.S. in 2002 were comparable to those last seen in the prebubble year of 1998, when $21.6 billion (C$32.4 billion) was disbursed. A similar but less pronounced trend occurred in Canada, where VC investments declined by 34 percent and 35 percent in 2001 and 2002, respectively, down from $5.8 billion in 2000 to $3.8 billion in 2001 and $2.5 billion in 2002, which is comparable to VC investments in 1998 ($1.6 billion) and 1999 ($2.7 billion).
The relative trends since the beginning of the decline of VC activity in 2001 were reversed during the first nine months of 2003. In the first three quarters of 2003, Canadian VC activity declined more sharply than U.S. VC activity, with investments totalling C$920 million — a 46-percent drop from the first nine months of 2002. In the U.S., VC investments declined by 27 percent, from C$25.2 billion in the first nine months of 2002 to C$18.4 billion in the first three quarters of 2003.
Canada is among the leading Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries
While the comparative performance of Canada and the U.S. can be measured relatively accurately, comparisons between Canada and other countries have been hampered by the lack of a common definition of VC, and by other methodological disparities. Consequently, existing studies on international VC markets must be treated cautiously.
According to the OECD (see Figure 14), Canada's VC market is well placed internationally and stands second behind only the U.S. in terms of VC investments as percentage of GDP allocated to early-stage and expansion investment.Footnote 56, Footnote 57 In other words, while the Canadian VC industry is relatively young and small compared to the U.S. VC industry, it is much more mature compared to that of any other OECD country.Footnote 58 A more detailed analysis of smaller countries that are trying to develop their VC markets, such as Australia, Israel or India, would probably be more appropriate and useful to Canadian policy-makers.
Figure 14: Venture Capital Investments as a Percentage of Gross Domestic Product Among Key Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Countries, 1995–2000
Footnote 34 Macdonald & Associates Limited, E. Wayne Clendenning, Alan Riding, and the OECD.
Footnote 35 Graham D. Taylor and Peter A. Baskerville, A Concise History of Business in Canada (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1994).
Footnote 36 LSVCCs are provincially based funds sponsored by labour unions and supported by individual investors on the basis of preferential tax provisions.
Footnote 37 Mary Macdonald, Venture Investing and Prudence (1987).
Footnote 38 Note that the term "investment" refers to the amounts invested in an investee company (as opposed to VC funds) and that the term "fund raised" refers to the amounts of capital raised by the VC funds from individual or corporate investors.
Footnote 39 Different studies have attempted to determine which came first: a venture capital industry that could support the development of high technology firms and clusters, or the presence of high-potential technology firms that could attract venture capital. In some cases, such as Ottawa, it appears that a strong entrepreneurship community helped create and develop a venture capital industry, which then reinforced the high technology cluster. While this may not be true of all regions and clusters, the emergence of high technology firms in the Ottawa Valley has strongly affected the growth of the Canadian VC industry over the past 10 years.
Footnote 40 VC firms often establish one or more VC funds with different investment focusses, which explains why there are more VC funds than VC firms.
Footnote 41 Goodman and Carr LLP, and McKinsey & Company, Private Equity Canada 2002 (2003).
Footnote 42 E. Wayne Clendenning & Associates, Assessment and Comparison of Key Issues Regarding the Operation of the Venture Capital Markets in Canada and the U.S. and their Implications for Private Sector Participants and Government Policy. (Report scheduled for publication in winter 2004).
Footnote 43 This distribution of investment is generally consistent with the regional distribution of economic activity and knowledge-based industry (KBI) firms. In 2002, Ontario attracted 40 percent of VC funds, 52 percent of VC investments, 45 percent of KBI firms and 41 percent of GDP. In 2002, Quebec attracted 27 percent of VC funds, 29 percent of VC investments, 20 percent of KBI firms and 21 percent of GDP.
Footnote 44 Macdonald & Associates Limited, VC Activity Report 2002 (2003).
Footnote 45 Paul A. Gompers, A Note on the Venture Capital Industry (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2001).
Footnote 46 Kirk Falconer, Prudence, Patience and Jobs (1999).
Footnote 47 To consult these proposed guidelines, visit the CVCA Web site at www.cvca.ca
Footnote 48 Data for 2001 and 2002 are not yet available for Canadian IPOs. As a result, the growth has been calculated from 1996 to 2000 to permit a comparable period.
Footnote 49 Cécile Carpentier, Maher Kooli, Jean-Marc Suret, Primary Issues in Canada: Status, Flaws and Dysfunctions (CIRANO, Université Laval, 2003).
Footnote 50 Goodman and Carr LLP, Private Equity Canada 2001 (2002).
Footnote 51 Goodman and Carr LLP, and McKinsey & Company, Private Equity Canada 2002 (2003).
Footnote 52 Paul A. Gompers, A Note on the VC Industry (Boston: Harvard Business School, 2001).
Footnote 53 For the purpose of this paper, an average exchange rate of 1.5 percent has been calculated for 1996–2002, based on information from the United Nations Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org).
Footnote 54 For the purpose of this paper, an average exchange rate of 1.5 percent has been calculated for 1996–2002 based on information from the United Nations Statistics Division (http://unstats.un.org).
Footnote 55 For example, Canadian returns data are gross, whereas U.S. data are net of management costs and other fees. As well, the returns data do not reflect the different structure and composition of the Canadian and U.S. VC markets.
Footnote 56 John K. Thompson and Sang-Mok Choi, Risk Capital in OECD Countries: Recent Developments and Structural Issues (OECD, 2001).
Footnote 57 Guusseli Baygan and Michael Freudenberg, The Internationalisation of Venture Capital Activity in OECD Countries: Implications for Measurement and Policy (OECD, 2000).
Footnote 58 Figure 14 only covers the period from 1995 to 2000 and, as a result, does not reflect the recent decline of U.S. activity levels and the relatively stable level of Canadian investments as a percentage of GDP.